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CONGESTION  AND  CRISIS 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this communication is to review the problem of congestion and crisis situations 
in air  traffic.  The  Commission considers  it  necessary  to  analyze the current  situation, 
identify its  causes and clarify the competences and responsibilities  of each stakeholder in 
such a way as to examine to what extent the situation can be further improved on the basis 
of actions ·already  taken by  the  aviation community.  Such a  review  is  essential  since 
· millions of our citizens will again, at the occasion of the great summer tourist migrations, 
experience long delays in crowded airports and face the frustration of holidays spoiled ·by 
the irritating problem of congested air space. 
· Air Traffic Control (ATC) is a vital eleinent in air safety.  Planes must be kept sufficiently 
separated to avoid collisions and given the speeds and flying conditions the crews cannot 
themselves  assume  this  function  without  the  ground  assistance  provided  by  air  traffic ' 
controllers. 
The Chicago Convention, signed in 1944, and to which nearly all States in the world are 
parties,  makes  individual States  responsible  for such services  in their air space.  It also 
created an agency, the I.nternational Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), whose role it is 
to draw up the necessary  standards to assure the inter-operability of the different systems 
established by the individual States so that aircraft can circulate throughout the world. 
I  . 
To the extent that each State remains the sole judge of the quality and quantity of services  . 
supplied in its air space, ICAO has also sought to develop mechanisms to adjust the supply 
to user needs. 
Certain European States, aware of the need for .closer regional cooperation to improve the 
planning and development of their control systems,  as  well as  their interest to carry  out 
certain tasks together,  created, in 1960, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation (EUROCONTROL) which today groups  17 States, of which only 11  belong to 
the Eumpean Union.  This organisation, originally founded to supply ATC servic~s in the 
European upper Airspace, has to date· only supplied such services for the Benelux countries 
and northern Gennany.  It is  today the only organisation with the required expertise and . 
resources to conceive complex programmes to improve air traffic in Europe and ensure their 
implementation. 
2 It was  only  during the  1980's that Europe  realised  that ATC  capacity could affect civil 
aviation development while it was always deemed previously  that  airport capacity and the 
number of runways environmentally sustainable were the sole limiting factors. 
In 1986, European airlines recorded that approximately 12% of  their flights suffered a delay 
of more than 15  minutes (from all  causes,  ATC,  weather,  company,  airport,  etc.).  This 
figure  reached  20%  in 1988  and '25%  in  1989  attributed  mainly  to  congestion.  Several 
studies made during this period evaluate the cost of ATC delay to have been between 1.5 
and 2. 5 billion ECU per year. 
This  serious  deterioration has  provoked  an  immediate  reaction from  all  political bodies · 
because  it  was  demonstrating  that  shortfalls  in ATC  threatens  the  liberalisation process 
necessary to complete the single market and proves a major obstacle to the implementation 
of basic liberties layed down in the Treaty,  particularly the free movement of citizens. 
Since  1988  the  Commission  has  proposed1  using  Treaty  provisions  and  Community 
resources  to find a solution to  this problem. 
The Parliament has  also  adopted  several  resolutions,  particularly  those  of 18  September 
1992 &  27 September 1994, urging Member States for closer cooperation to  implement a 
coordinated programme of actions and make use  of community mechanisms to  guarantee 
its execution. 
The  European Council, in Essen,  also  recalled the priority to be given to  the Air Traffic 
Management system. 
Despite  these  initiatives  the  Member  States  have  always  preferred  to  work  within  the 
framework of ECAC and EUROCONTROL.  The role of the Community has been largely 
confined to financing initiatives taken by these organisations (EATCHIP2,  AP  ATSI3)  or to 
legislating the standards adopted by EUROCONTROL. 
To this end the Commission has supported these programmes to the tune of 5 million ECU 
and  provided 30 million ECU to  finance  research  into Air Traffic Management (ATM). 
The Community has also,  in 1993, adopted a Directive4 on the definition and utilisation of 
compatible technical specifications for the purchase of Air Traffic Management equipment 
and systems. 
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2  European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme 
3  Airport I Air Traffic Services Interface 
4  Directive EEC/93/65- JOn· L 187 of 29.7.1993 
3 The National Administrations responsible·for·supplyirig ATC services.have rriade on their 
·;side considerable efforts to increase the capacity of  their systems within these programmes 
and using the expertise and resources  of EUROCONTROL..  They have increased their 
investments, hired and trained· many more controllers. 
'  According to figures published for the Ministerial meeting of the European Civil Aviation 
Conference the current level of investment for ATC in the ECAC area is around 1.2 billion 
ECU and the total cost of ATC en route services has increased by 50 %between 19.86 and 
1993  ~see Annex 1). 
This has produced encouraging results up to 1994; since; according-to figures p:Qblished by 
lATA, the number of flights delayed by more than 15  minutes is  back to the !  986 leyel. 
despite a 50 % increase in traffic (see Annex 2)., ·.  · 
.  '  . 
Nevertheless the results remain far below the expectation of airspace users, the cost of  ATC . 
delays being estimated  to be still between 1.2 and 2billiqn ECU. At the same time the 
ATC element .  of the total operating cost-of inti'~-European sezyices  has increased from 
3,  8  % in 1986 to 5,  6% in 1994 according to AEA figures. It may even reach 20 . % of the 
total cost for regional services. 
Furthermore the .figures available for the  last half .of 1994 and the- first months of 1995 
indicate a  break in the previous trend towards reduction of delays and possibly. a reverse. 
trend (see Annex 3). 
These figures  show· that despite huge increases  1n costs,  the methods used up to  now to 
increase the efficiency of the European-air traffic control services are reaclling the~r limits. 
It is  therefore  necessary  to give  a  new impetus  to  the 'whole process of improving the 
European'· Air Traffic Management system.  ·  .  · 
. The Commission will prepare, for the end of 1995, a White .Paper outlining in detai( its 
strategy to create a truly· unified ATM.system for Europe.  The following elements will be 
considered  :·  ·  . .  . 
5 
integration  of  ATM  in  the  Trans-European  Network  system  in  order  to  raise · 
supplementary  resourc~s  from  ·different.  Community,  Funds·  (Co~esion.  Funds, 
Infrastructure Fund, PHARE,  ....  ) to accelerate the necessary standardisation actions and 
upgrading  prog~ammes undertak~n in the framework .  of EATCfiiP and AP  ATSI and 
encourage  regional  projects  of  cooperation  such  as  CEATS5  and  the  Nordic 
harmonisation programme; 
.  .  .  . 
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CIIIIIIJn  4 utilisation of Community  Research  and Development Programmes  to  elaborate,  in a 
more coordinated manner,  the new EATMS6  concept and techniques required to meet 
the expected increase of demand; 
consideration of the most appropriate institutional framework to provide A  TC services 
to ensure that the European dimension is  taken into account, the economic and social 
imp;:tct is duly assessed and the provisions of the Treaty and the international obligations 
of the Member States of the Union are respected. 
It will take some time before such a new initiative produces results.  In the meantime, the 
reappearance each summer of crisis situations which affect the European travellers and the 
economies  of several  peripheral  European  regions7  obliges. us  to  examine  in  detail the 
methods used to handle air traffic congestion in order to examine how to improve them to 
prevent crises or reduce their impact. 
It is  in this spirit that the Commission has widely consulted national administrations, users 
and Unions  in order to  determine how to build on what exists to  make the system more 
efficient without increasing the costs for users  or adding new institutional layers. 
The Commission considers that the implementation of the measures described in this paper 
which takes account of these consultations can contribute effectively to the achievement of 
these objectives. 
1.- MANAGEMENT OF CONGESTION AND CRISIS 
As  early  as  the  seventies  the  aeronautical community had become aware of the  need to 
anticipate  the  risk  of congestion  in  order  to  avoid  overloads  incompatible  with  the 
maintenance of safety standards. The objective was essentially to keep on the ground aircraft 
which would otherwise have been in a part of the airspace  at a time when it would have 
been impossible to handle them safely.  A number of national Air Traffic Flow Management 
(ATFM) units were created. 
The crisis at the end of the eighties highlighted the strategic importance of A  TFM and in 
particular the necessity to carry it out on as large a scale as possible in order to benefit from 
an overall view and thus make it possible to use the available ATC capacity efficiently. 
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The cost of ATC arrival and departure delays at Palma airpon for the peak season '94 (May to October) can be evaluated 
at half a billion ECU for the airlines withour mentioning the prejudice to  the passengers and the local economy . 
•  5 Jbis triggered t;he  States, working with the European and. North Atlantic Office of ICAO 
and EUROCONTROL,  to  agree a centralised concept  ~or Air  Traffi~ Flow· Management. 
The creation of the Centr3;l Flow Management Unit (CFMU) was the natural C()nsequence. 
The CFMU operates  on behalf of all  the  32  States  of ECAC  i.e.· most of the  States  of 
Western Europe.  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  · 
'  . 
The procedures have been progressively  impro~ed in order to warn the Users  beforehand 
of the restrictions  which will be implemented and to suggest alternatiye routes.  The same 
kriowledge may be used to  optimise the operation of control  ce~tres and to better allocate 
resources to the threatened sectors. 
In the  future,'  air traffic  flow  management will become  a,Q.  Integral  part of Air Traffic . 
Management because  economics  tell us that  increase  in the  quality  of servjce  beyond. a 
certain level,  even  if technically  and  environmentally possible,  ca'nnot  be ecqnomically 
justified and that we have therefore to  learn to  live at certa:in tiipes with an ''acceptable" 
level of undercapacity.  It will then be necessary to define and imp lenient rules, means, and 
procedures to m~ke the best use of this capacity and minimise the effects of congestion on 
those peak days or hours when demand .exceeds the .agreed. capacity.  The same m~chanisms 
wiU be also available to manage crisis situations when capacity is· temporarily reduced for . 
unplanned reasons  such as  strikes,  equipment failures.,  restrictions  on the  use  of certain 
areas of European airspa~e; etc.  .  .  .  . 
1.1.  The strategic phase 
'  '  .  '  .  .  . 
Strategic ATFM planning comprises ·an  actions taken well  in advance.  The  main 
thrust  takes place during  the  winter  months  when· preparations  are  made for the 
following  summer  season.  However  strategic  planning  is  a continUOJIS  process 
leading  into  the  pretactical  phase  which  starts  two  days  ahead  of the.  day  of 
operation  .. This first stage. of the process co~sists of reviewing lessons learnt during 
the previous season and comparing the predicted de,TI.arid  ~nd capacity in order to 
identify potential bottlenecks.  ·  · · 
· Previously most o(  this work was carried .out during the ATS/  ATFM Cp-ordination 
Meetings organised by ICAO in !Qe autumn and spring andat which Providers and 
users meet to take stock of the past and appraise the ·futUre.  Since 1991 the CFMU 
has  been responsible  for  co-ordinating  strategic  planning.  ·n  organises  regional 
meetings  where required  and  a five  day meeting of  all European ATS  authorities 
shortly before the plan is  finalised  at thespring ICAO ATS/ATFM Co-oi'dinatipn 
meeting.  In the late seventies  and early eighties planning was based ori statistics 
. provided by some States but it was not possible to have a· proper Europe wide view 
of the  situation.  Since  1985  EUROCONTROL has  been collecting data from  the 
Users concerning their planned operations for the coming months a~d this has added 
***''* 
. ,6. a new dimension to  the  planning process.  However the data provided,  although 
useful,  is  incomplete  because  business  aviation,  air taxi  services,  air  ambulance 
services  general aviation and military traffic are unable to  plan far  ahead and the 
charter operators are often faced with late changes as  tourist fashion swings from 
one  resort  to  another.  It is  currently  considered  that at this  initial  stage  of the 
evaluation only 80%  of the demand is known. 
The ATS  authorities provide the CFMU with the capacity values of their sectors. 
Capacity values are obtained by different methods and reduced by varying amounts 
to provide safety margins, which are necessary because the current manual system 
is  imprecise  and sectors  frequently  have to  work with traffic  levels  over 50%  in 
excess  of the  declared  capacity.  The  first  weeks  of CFMU  tactical  operations 
indicate that its  automated system is  capable of metering the  traffic to much finer 
limits which will ultimately allow the declared capacities to be brought into line with 
the real capacity. 
The main result of this phase is the traffic orientation scheme (T. 0.  S.) which is a 
set of mandatory  itineraries  whose  object is  to  spread  the  traffic  geographically 
across  the  various  routes  in such a way  as  to  reduce  the  demand  at  foreseeable 
bottlenecks.  There may also be recommendations aimed at exerting pressure on the 
users to avoid certain areas  or certain periods and on the providers to profit from 
the  foreknowledge  of a  problem  in  order  to  resolve  it.  Strategic  planning  also 
includes co-ordinating arrangements for any events known in advance and which will 
result  in  increased  demand  or reduced  capacity  (major  sporting  events  or the · 
running-in period when a control centre starts to use new equipment or systems). 
1. 2.  The pretactical phase 
In the days which precede, each day of operation improved knowledge of the demand 
allows a more precise analysis of the demand/capacity situation. 
The CFMU has effectively carried out this work since 1994 and publishes each day, 
in the name of ECAC States, the ATFM Notification Message (ANM) giving details 
of the restrictions which will affect the traffic of the following day (flows involved, 
periods  of the  day  concerned,  acceptable  flow  rates,  etc.)  and  may  recommand 
alternative routes. 
As the use of the recommended alternative routes is not mandatory there is no way 
of knowing in advance if they will be used, how far the traffic will be redistributed 
and how it might move the congestion to other areas. 
•  7 1. 3.  The tactical phase 
This last stage of the ATFM process is  the really operational phase.  It consists of 
.  ~· ·  imple·menting the measures announced in the previous phases  in so far as  the real 
situation justifies it." 
·Any· non-exempted or non-priority flight whose flight plan indicates that it will enter 
a "restricted"  sector is  allocated an "ATC  slot",  ie.  a time of departUre  leading to 
a specified time of entry to the sector in question. The slot" is calculated so that the 
flow through the sector does not exceed the declared capacity. Slots are allocated on 
the basis of "first planned, first served".  This in fact establishes virtual queues on 
the basis of the users  intentions as announced in their flight plans. 
Flights coming from too  far away  to  respect a slot are exempt from restrictions. 
Flights  for  humanitarian  reasons  and  flights  expressly  designated  by  national 
authorities have priority. 
Until recently this work was carried out by national or regional Flow Management 
Units (FMU). It is gradually being transferred to the CFMU (starting in April 1995 
. with the  area  previously  managed by  the  Paris  Flow  I Management  Unit)  so  that 
tactical flow management for the whole of western Europe will be carried out by the 
CFMU from spring  1996. 
The  five  Flow  Management  Units  (Frankfurt,  London,  Madrid,  Rome  and  the 
CFMU) are in permanent contact with ATC  through Flow Management Positions 
(FMP) in each control centre so that any event likely to affect the situation can be 
immediately  integrated  and  reflected  at the  operational  level.  These  might be  an · 
improvement in the traffic situation: or increase in capacity justifying a relaxation or 
· the suppression of restrictions  but also  a ·deterioration requiring the reinforcement 
of restrictions or the implementation of new ones.  ' 
1.4.  \Crisis Management 
Following the establishment of an ad-hoc crisis cell to deal  with the events of July 
1994  it has  been accepted that norma'!  flow .management  mechanisms  may  need 
· support  in  handling  some  crises,  due  to  ilie  requiremen( for  rapid,  high  level 
decisions  e.g.  concerning  the  allocation  of  resources,  which  are  beyond  the 
competence of ATFM experts. 
The EUROCONTROL Member States have accordingly decided to create a Crisis 
Management  Group  which  will  meet  when necessary  in  support  of the  CFMU. 
States  are  represented  by  senior  officials from  their Air  Navigation Directorate. 
Those directly involved in any particular crisis will be convened by the CFMU and 
will constitute the cell dealing with that situation. 
8 2.- AREAS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
The mechanisms which have been described are based on transparency and voluntary action 
by  the  various  actors  involved.  These  consider  that' the  mechanisms  are,  in  general, 
satisfactory and place great hopes in the full implementation of the CFMU to improve their 
operation and efficiency. 
It  is,  nevertheless,  useful  to  examine  these  mechanisms  to  determine  whether  the 
introduction of a minimum of obligation or of incentive to  co-operate,  depending on the 
situation, could accelerate and strengthen that improvement. 
2 .1.  Planning 
As seen from the outside the main weakness of the existing mechanisms dealing with 
air traffic flow management is  the lack of certainty.  Goodwill  is  certainly not in 
question,  but the willingness of each actor to retain as  much flexibility as  possible 
hinders serious advance planning. 
The result is that airspace Users do not know by how much they will be penalised 
until the moment when they receive their ATC  slots;  at the same  time they cannot 
really  evaluate the  benefit they  would  get  by  changing  their  flight plans.  As  a 
consequence many of them stick to their initial plans and try to  negotiate their slot 
in  real  time  contributing  to  increasing  the  workload  of the  flow  management 
units. The final victim is the passenger who, in most cases,  is waiting in expectation 
of an early departure never confirmed. 
Changing this situation would require great efforts by  all  actors  to  better· evaluate 
the  foreseeable  demand  and  available  capacity  and  to  develop  through  increased 
cooperation mechanisms  to adjust them further in order to achieve a balance. 
2.1.1.  Capacity 
Everybody agrees that better advanced knowledge of the available capacity would 
be a significant improvement, particularly if figures  announced could be binding. 
Today  each  ATC  centre  determines  its  capacity  on  the  basis  of the  available 
resources  and is  more inclined to  cope with its own internal constraints than with 
other's requirements.  It was  only  in  1995  that  a first  attempt at global  advance 
planning took place in order to  satisfy the Spanish request for a better preparation 
of the summer season in order to avoid the reappearance of crisis situations in the 
south west of Europe. 
9 It would therefore be desirable to develop a standard method and tools to determine 
the available ATC sector capacity and the establishment of procedures for common 
advance planhing.  The result of such planning should be binding,· except in cases 
of unforeseeable disruption, and be used by the airspace Users and airports to better 
plan and organise their own activities. 
In the same spirit Traffic Orientation Schemes (T.O.S.) could be quantified in order 
to give an indication of the flows assigned routes can bear thus giving the operators 
a chance to plan in accordance.  · 
To  carry out this  work in good conditions the  CFMU should use  supplementary 
means  to  assure  co-ordination  between  the  suppliers  and  could  even  be  given 
sufficient authority to take decisive actions. 
2.1.2.  Demand 
It is clear that congestion is to some extent created artificially by the scheduling of 
the Aircraft Operators in response to market demand. This is influenced by several 
factors  but  the  most  marked  of these  is  the requirement  of tour  operators  to 
concentrate traffic on certain destination areas  on certain days of the week.  This, 
coupled with the economic requirement of the Users to plan their first departure as. 
soon as the aerodrome curfew is lifted and to return on the last flight of the day just 
before the curfew is  applied,  leads to a theoretical planning which would generate. 
waves of traffic operating to and from the same areas  in unison. 
· If it  is  universally  recognised  that  in a  commercially  competitive  environment, 
aircraft operators must have the flexibility to meet their market requirements,  it is 
also admitted that a minimum of  realism and self control should be introduced in the 
planning of their activities if passengers are to receive the  serv~ce that they deserve . 
. To  achieve  this  /goal,  both  airports  and  airspace  Users  should  give  more 
consideration to ATC restrictions. 
The planning of movements at many aerodromes  is carried out by local scheduling 
committees and co-ordinated at global level by lATA scheduling conferences, using 
rules  largely developed by the industry itself, to spread the. traffic over t4e day in 
such  a  way  as  to  keep' traffic  and  passenger  flows  within  the  capacity  of the 
aerodrome facilities.  The possibility of implementing similar rules, developed co-
operatively,  to limit the concentration described  above and reduce the difference 
between the demand and the en-route ?apacity should be examined. 
10 In order to  encourage such co-operation,  the  authorities  may  have  to  create the 
appropriate  conditions.  On one hand all  parties  involved  in the  flight  planning 
should be allowed to  meet and co-ordinate  in order to  make  a better use  of the 
available capacity.  As  already done for airport slot co-ordination,  such activities 
need to be consistent with anti-trust  law.  On the other hand there  should be an 
incitement to agree on and accept common rules.  This could be achieved by letting 
the passengers know who is planning realistically and who is not, as it is done in the 
United  States  for  many  years  where  airlines  punctuality  figures  are  published 
regularly so that users can compare the quality of the services provided. 
In the same spirit of better adjustment of demand to capacity,  airport scheduling 
should consider establishing capacity figures which integrate ATC constraints as  is 
currently done, in a limited way, by the scheduling authority of Frankfurt Airport 
for certain flows.  What is the use of programming ten departures in a limited time 
frame towards a specified direction when it is  known in advance that only half of 
· them can really take off ? This is already done for parameters of a similar nature in 
the direct environment of the airport (aircraft parking limitations, check-in facilities, 
capacity  of waiting  rooms,  constraints  in  neighbouring  sectors,  the  influence of 
arrival and departure procedures,  etc ...  ).  Integration of the airport slot allocation 
mechanisms and the air traffic flow management process deserves therefore further 
consideration.  In such  a  complex  area  this  necessitates  an  important  in-depth 
analysis. 
2. 2.  Priority rules. 
In any society in which relations between individuals are not dictated solely by force 
alone, the most equitable way, as a first approximation, to adjust demand to supply 
is  the  "first come,  first  served"  queue.  This  is  exactly what happens  in the final 
phase  of air  traffic  flow  management  today.  One  may  however  ask  if,  as  in 
advanced societies, other means, based on voluntary co-operation and/or laws, might 
not be preferable. 
· All phases of the ATFM process involve the application of priority in one form or 
another. Strategic planning results in a routing scheme which permits only specified 
traffic flows to use specified routes. Pretactical planning may involve the application 
of ad-hoc orientations and some traffic may be obliged to fly  at uneconomic lower 
levels  in order to  make use of spare capacity in the lower sectors  and reduce the 
demand and delay in upper sectors.  While such decisions are taken solely with the 
objective of improving the global use of capacity they inevitably favour some flows 
and penalise others and in that sense are applications of ·priority. 
11 · In the tactical phase slots are allocated and· hence delay is apportioned, in accordance 
with the current rule,  "first planned,  first served".  Whilst this  rule has  universal 
acceptance among Users and Providers it is only effective if all the potential traffic 
is  known before slots are issued. )'his is often .not the case when flights departing 
from aerodromes close to a restriCted area are in competition with flights departing 
from aerodromes far away and which therefore file their flight plan and require their 
slot earlier.  · 
The Flow Management Units  so~etimes.  intervene to give ·a 'measure of  pr~ority. to' 
individual  flights- which  have  specific  difficulties  or. exceptional  delay.  Used 
circumspectly these initiatives are not questioned. 
It would be useful to consider for each phase of ATFM  operations what .priority 
. rules  would  lead  tq  the  most  efficient  use .  of the  available  capacity.  and  what 
. compromises  might be. necess~ry. in  order · to  m~e  such rules  acceptable  to  all · 
· .. concerned. 
The CFMU is  responsible for the co-ordination of strategic planning, for carrying 
out pretactical  plaiining  and  qas  started. to  take  over  the  execution  of ·tactical 
·operations.  As  has been sho.wn  above the  CFMU in the  course of this  activity is  · 
called upon to make  decisions  which have  a bearing  on priority  and  the  way  in 
which the inevitable penalties (uneconomic flight levels, additional mileage or delay) 
are distributed among the users. 
Whiie each State publishes the traffic orientation scheme in the form of a NOT  AM 
or  AIC8,  thus  making  it  obligatory,  the  same  cannot·  be  . said  o( other 
recommendations or procedures. It  has been argued that the common agreement that 
. the  CFMU  should  publish  the  ANM  is  a .  de  facto  delegation  of responsibility 
however there has been no corresponding transfer of authority to give legaJ support 
to its actions and decisions.  · 
'  .  ,· 
.  Again consideration should. be given to the necessity to _provide  the. CFMU with a 
proper legal basis for its work .. This must give a\lthority to its decisions  whil~t at the 
· same time defining the framework within which it is empowered to act. . 
· 2.3.  The. management of crises. 
.  8 
The  EUROCONTROL crisis  cell has  been established.  It. will  certainly  learn by 
experience but must be  consi~ered competent to deal with the sole ATM aspects of 
. any crisis,. i.e.  to make the best use of the remaining .  resources . 
NOTAM: Notice to  AirMen 
AIC : Aeronautical Information Circular 
4111NW  1.2  . Some situations may however ca11  for action beyond the competence of the A  TM 
authorities :-
it may be necessary under some circumstances to lift aerodrome curfews or to 
make use of military facilities and airspace; 
if a  critical  Air Traffic  Control  Centre  was  significantly  or  totally  disabled, 
temporary arrangments for the restoration of  an acceptable level of  service in and 
around  the  airspace  of that  Centre  would  certainly  require  international  co-
operation and agreement. 
It should be considered therefore whether there is a need for the EUROCONTROL 
Crisis Cell to have access to support at a high political level and if so how this could 
best be organised. Bearing in mind that under these circumstances meetings have to 
be arranged in hours and decisions reached and implemented in days, constraining 
powers may be required to enable quick reaction through an international framework 
of contingency planning. 
The common element of all crises is a dramatic reduction of capacity. It may not be 
possible for all of the displaced demand to be absorbed by  the very limited spare 
capacity of surrounding sectors. Under these circumstances it may be necessary to 
make painful decisions as to priority. It is therefore proposed that the examination 
of  priority rules proposed above should include special rules which might be invoked 
in  crisis  situations.  This  would  have  to  be  supported  by  a  decision  making 
mechanism  for  authorising  the  CFMU  to  apply  the  modified  rule  in  any  given 
circumstances. 
Some States have established minimum service levels which must be provided in case 
of industrial action. It would be useful for planning purposes if there was a common 
standard applied throughout the region. It would be even more useful if  the standard 
could be defined in such a way as to limit the interference to international overflying 
traffic. The difficulty of  obtaining agreement between unions and management across 
the E.U. is not underestimated nevertheless it is considered that an  effort should be 
made to  define  and  apply  a  commonly  agreed  minimum  service  level  for  A  TM 
services. 
3.  A EUROPEAN APPROACH 
Although  the  foregoing  analysis  has  demonstrated  that  the  aeronautical  world  has  not 
neglected  the  problems  posed  by  the  congestion  of  European  airspace,  important 
improvements  are  still  necessary  and  possible  provided  that they  are  supported  by  real 
political will. In this spirit the European Union should define a strategy which addresses the 
following objectives. 
.  ..  13 3  .1.  An organisation with authority 
It is certain that EUROCONTROL and the CFMU have already undertaken many 
tasks in the domain of air traffic flow management but the framework within which 
they carry them out is  not well defined and the division of responsibilities remains 
uncertain.  On the other hand there remains much to be done in the field of strategic 
flow planning and the integration of ATFM techniques into ATC. To this end, the· 
CFMU, could be given,  in additionJo its  operational  tasks, ·the responsibility  of 
ensuring  better  co-ordination  and  real  planning  as  underlined  in  the  preceding 
Chapter.  This could imply that. it also  has  the means  to  monitor and  enforce the · 
decisions taken,  such as  slots allocated, routes assigned,  capacities agreed, etc ... 
3.2..  Equitable rules for giving access to airspace . 
Although this is a delicate subject it is not contested that it represents a vast and as 
yet unexplored,  area for improvement.  In the short term it is  necessary to define,. 
in conjunction with all concerned, Community standards for a minimum service that 
takes into account the legitimate interests of all involved in the case of a sudden and 
.  I 
unexpected reduction of capacity whether due to a strike or. equipment failure. 
It should also be considered whether new rules on priority and re-routing of traffic 
. would  permit ·a. more  efficient use  of a,irspace  and. an equitable  sharing  of the 
.  available capacity whilst better taking  into  account the  political objectives  of the  . 
Community particularly in the fields of  economic and social cohesion. It would then 
be necessary to decide if and how such rules might be implemented bearing in mind 
. that  any  regulation  should  be  limited  to the strict  minimum  consistent  with  the 
objective to be attained. 
3.3~  Reinforced co-operation 
... 
One  of. the  main characteristics  of the· cm;rent  situation  is  that  each player  acts 
. independently of the others although knowing that what is being planned cannot be 
realised. Tour operators sell holidays which concentrate the movement of tourists ~m 
specific  resorts  on  specific  days,  the  transport  companies  schedule  their  flights 
accordingly, airports allocate the corresponding slots,. the air traffic control centres 
calculate their capacity on the basis of the resources available, when the day arrives 
the  queues  are. managed  as  well  as  possible  and  the  final  victim  of all  this 
improvisation is  the passenger. 
While all of this is probably natural in a liberal environment the objective of which 
is  to satisfy the client, it unfortunately results in exactly the opposite.  Under these 
14 conditions regulations will not help.  Only  better co-ordination between the actors, 
more responsible behaviour and respect for the passengers will allow the provision 
of a  better  service  while  contributing  to  the  efficiency  and  competitiveness  of 
European air transport operators. 
In addition it would be useful to  research ways of ensuring a better co-ordination 
between  the  allocation  of airport  slots  and  the  planning  of traffic  flows  using 
available experience to develop new concepts. 
Finally  it  is  important  to  provide  information  so  that  passengers  can  make  an 
informed choice of the services which they buy and the other actors are encouraged 
to do their best to satisfy their needs.  This requires knowledge of the performance 
and  quality  of service  which  are  being  offered.  This  could  be  achieved  by  the 
systematic publication of  comparable punctuality indicators for airports and airlines. 
3.4.  Political crisis management 
Experience has shown that crisis management carried out only at the operational level 
may be insufficient because the solution of some problems which may arise on these 
occasions requires high level political decisions in different domains. 
To correct this deficiency, a group composed of  representatives of  the Member States 
at  a level  where all  parties concerned would be involved, particularly the internal 
affairs and defence ministers, could augment the crisis unit of EUROCONTROL to 
examine without delay those situations which could not be resolved at its level or to 
ensure the execution of its recommendations. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
Much remains to be done to prevent the reappearance of critical situations related to airspace 
congestion  and to mitigate the consequences of crisis situations.  Even if the outstanding 
problems are  complex and not of a  nature  to  be solved by  short term actions,  a  certain 
number of initiatives can be taken in the framework of the existing structures, to support the 
mechanisms and bodies recently established and to improve further their efficiency : 
·political support to the Crisis Cell of EUROCONTROL~ 
cpmgwa  CPilii'i'P  15 define,  in conjunction  with  all  partners  involved,  the  modalities  of a  common 
minimum  service  in  case  of  crisis  and  examination  in  conjunction  with 
EUR.bCbNTROL1  the  establishment 'of ·alternative  priority  rules  for  access  to 
airspace under both normal and crisis conditions; 
publication of punctuality indicators comparable with airports and airlines; 
better planning of traffic flows and integration of ATC constraints in the allocation 
of airport slots; 
cooperative.sbaring of  availabl~ ATC  capacity; 
N~yertbeless  the  Commission  is  conscious  that  such  actions,  atmmg  at  more  closely 
correlating capacity and demand in order to. minimise the .inconvenience of congestion for 
the  Passengers  and  the  Users,  must  not  in any  way  lead  to  a  relaxation of the  efforts 
deployed to  increase the overall capacity of the European Air Traffic Control System. 
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